





KubeRosy: Dynamic System Call Filtering Framework for Containers

Jin Her

Department of Computer Science & Engineering

Incheon National University


Index


- Introduction
- Motivation
- KubeRosy Design
 - Overall Architecture
 - Why eBPF and LSM used?
 - Policy Inheritance
 - Operator
- Evaluation
- Conclusion



Introduction

- Rapid migration to cloud-native environments
- Technically, containers share the host's kernel
- Thus, securing system calls in the cloud is **ESSENTIAL** for protecting the kernel






758067 C


Gartner

Motivation

- Seccomp(secure computing mode) for containers
 - Attach a seccomp profile to containers when they are deployed
 - **CANNOT** update or delete a seccomp profile at runtime




KubeRosy Design: Overall Architecture





KubeRosy Design: Why eBPF and LSM used?


• LSM Hooks can be directly involved in the execution flow of a system call, but triggered by multiple system calls!






KubeRosy Design: Policy Inheritance

- Attach tracepoints to the fork, vfork, clone, and clone3 system calls, which creates processes
- Tracepoint's callback function determines if the policy should be applied



KubeRosy Design: Operator


- Watcher monitor the Kubernetes API
- Enforcer creates a job on the node where the Pod with the policy is deployed





Evaluation

- Running on Ubuntu 22.04, Kernel v5.15
- 28 system calls supported by KubeRosy





Conclusion

- In this paper, we propose a system call security framework to secure the limitations of seccomp using LSM and eBPF.
- Limited by the small number of supported system calls relative to the total number of system calls
- Future work
 - Adding supported system calls
 - Implement more detailed security policies with filtering based on argument values for system calls

