Kadapter:
Kata 컨테이너를 위한 보안 집행 프레임워크

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Background: Kata containers

- Dual isolation of containers as lightweight virtual machines



Background: KubeArmor

- Restrict the behavior of pods, containers, and nodes at the system level
- Runtime Security is an important one since most of the attacks are manifested in Runtime.

```
kind: KubeArmorPolicy
metadata:
  name: block-apt-exec
spec:
  selector:
    matchLabels:
      app: nginx
  process:
    matchPaths:
    - path: /usr/bin/apt
  action:
    Block
```

KubeArmor

container(app:nginx)

 # apt update

bash: line 1: /usr/bin/apt: **Operation not permitted**
command terminated with code 126

Motivation



There is no **security enforcement framework** that supports the **Kata container.**

Analysis of KubeArmor

1. KubeArmor attaches BPF program to LSM Hook
2. It detects policy-related resources and store them in the BPF map
3. BPF-LSM program queries the BPF map to block actions that violate policies

However, Kata container is isolated by **individual guest kernel**



Kadapter Design: Approach

1. The same BPF-LSM programs and BPF maps are loaded into the guest kernel of the Kata virtual machine as the host kernel.
2. When a policy related to Kata containers is detected, it is sent inside the Kata virtual machine for enforcement



Kadapter Design: Component

Kadapter Componenet

Kadapter
Detect and send Kata container related policies on Master node

Kadapter-Agent
Manage BPF-LSM Program and enforce policies inside the Kata virtual machine

Modified Component

Guest Kernel
Rebuilded to support BPF Program

Kata Agent
Modified to obtain the PID of the container inside the Kata virtual machine



Kadapter Design: Workflow



Evaluation: Use case(1)

Test the feasibility with scenarios that limit process execution for containers with "app=nginx" labels



Evaluation: Use case(2)

Verified that policies for network and file operations are enforced correctly.

	Network	File

Policy	kind: KubeArmorPolicy
	...
	spec:
	  selector:
	  matchLabels:
	  app: nginx
	  network:
	  matchProtocols:
	  - protocol: icmp
	  action:
	  Block
		kind: KubeArmorPolicy
		...
		spec:
		  selector:
		  matchLabels:
		  app: nginx
		  file:
		  matchDirectories:
		  - dir: /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/
		action:
		  Block

Result	nginx-kata# **ping 8.8.8.8** ping: 1.1.1.1: **Address family for hostname not supported** **command terminated with exit code 2**	nginx-kata# **cat /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/...** cat: /run/secrets/kubernetes.io/...: **Permission denied**

Conclusion and Future Work

- Design runtime security enforcement system for kata container, and demonstrate that it is feasible through experiments
- Increase policy management convenience by expanding to Kata container without modifying existing KubeArmor policies
- In future work, improve performance by minimizing the overhead that occurs in policy enforcement